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In this working paper I define inclusive growth as growth conducive to increasing the size and 
economic command of the middle class. I suggest a definition of the middle class based on absolute 
and relative measures of country-based income distributions, and present evidence of change in the 
size of the “middle class” for selected developing countries. I then review how macroeconomic 
policies shape the environment and incentives for inclusive growth, focusing on three areas: fiscal 
discipline, the more rule-based the better; a fair tax and redistribution system; and a business friendly 
exchange rate.   
 
The adoption of macro policies that favor the middle class lays the foundation for more economically 
and politically sustainable development. While on the whole sound macro policy that is good for the 
middle class is also likely to be pro-poor, tradeoffs may exist with respect to tax, expenditure and 
transfer programs and responses to economic shocks. Governments should consider the weighted 
welfare outcomes of alternative approaches to macro policy, rather than un-weighted growth or overly 
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  1 
Introduction 
 
Growth that is shared, or so-called inclusive growth, is now widely embraced as the central 
economic goal for developing countries.  But definitions and empirical characterizations of 
inclusive growth vary widely. In this brief I define and characterize empirically inclusive 
growth as that growth that builds a middle class.  I then review how macroeconomic 
policies shape the environment and incentives for inclusive growth, focusing on three 
areas: fiscal discipline, the more rule-based the better; a “fair” fisc with respect to revenues 
and expenditures; and a business-friendly exchange rate. These are policies conducive to 
growth; I do not mean to imply that they are underlying causes of growth. I rely heavily on 
experience (mostly unhappy) of the mostly middle-income countries in Latin America.  I 
also refer briefly to the implications of the discussion for heavily aid-dependent low-
income countries, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
From pro-poor growth to inclusive “middle class” growth  
 
In the last several decades, pro-poor growth emerged as a gentle counterpoint to a singular 
concern with growth alone (measured in terms of increases in per capita income), while 
implicitly recognizing that growth, if not always sufficient for poverty reduction, is almost 
certainly necessary.
1  Inclusive growth includes but extends pro-poor growth, on the 
grounds that growth that is good for the large majority of people in developing countries is 
more likely to be economically and politically sustainable. Growth that is sustained over 
many decades matters because many low and middle-income countries that have had long 
growth episodes – of eight to ten years – have subsequently suffered prolonged growth 
collapses while still well short of the average per capita income levels which make possible 
real gains in human development and general well-being.
2   
 
For macro policies is there a meaningful distinction between those conducive to pro-poor 
vs. inclusive growth?  Sound fiscal and monetary policies that are pro-poor are also likely 
to be good for the middle class on the whole.  But tradeoffs may exist with respect to 
specific tax, expenditure and transfer policies; and in the case of macroeconomic shocks, 
middle class households, to the extent their members are small business owners or semi-
skilled workers in industry or services, may face greater relative losses of permanent 
income than poor subsistence farmers.  
 
In the end, the possible tensions or tradeoffs between strictly pro-poor and more inclusive 
“middle-class” growth policies cannot be generalized.  They must be assessed policy by 
policy in each country, and are likely to change over time as circumstances change. One 
message of this note is that policymakers in developing countries (and their international 
supporters and advisers) should more systematically consider weighted welfare outcomes 
when selecting and fine-tuning macro policies, rather than unweighted growth outcomes or 
                                                 
1 Kraay (2006). 
2 Birdsall (2007) summarizes the evidence of this for Africa, based on Hausmann, Pritchett & Rodrik (2004) 
which summarizes the evidence that many countries that have had long growth episodes subsequently have 
growth collapses. 
  2overly weighted poverty outcomes.  A second is that where there are no tradeoffs, all the 
better. The medium-term benefits of good macro policy for building a middle class argue 
all the more for what are sometimes painful macro decisions in the short run.  
 
Defining the middle class. 
 
Inclusive growth implies an increase in the proportion of people in the middle class 
(implying some exit of people out of poverty), and the proportion of total income they 
command, implying gains in the middle at the “expense” either of the initially poor or the 
initially rich.
3  I define the “middle class” to include people at or above the equivalent of 
$10 day in 2005, and at or below the 90
th percentile of the income distribution in their own 
country
4. This definition implies some absolute and global threshold below which people 
are too poor to be middle class in any society, and some relative and local threshold above 
which people are at least in their own society “rich”.   
 
The absolute minimum can be thought of as a minimum income for a person or household 
to have the economic security associated with middle class status in an integrated global 
economy.  The relative maximum, which obviously varies across countries, can be thought 
of as excluding that portion of the population within a country whose income is most likely 
to be from inherited wealth, or based on prior or current economic rents associated with 
monopoly or other privileges, and thus less associated with productive and primarily labor 
activity than for the non-rich. I set the threshold at the 90
th decile of income because across 
almost all developing countries for which we have information on income distributions, 
Table 1 shows that the ratio of income of the 10
th to the 9
th decile ranges from two to more 
than four and is far greater than the ratio of income of the 9
th to the 8
th decile. (For OECD 
countries the 10/9 ratio also exceeds the 9/8 ratio but is always below two.) 
 
Defined in this manner, an increase in the size and economic power of the middle class is 
likely to signal that the underlying growth is based on wealth creation and productivity 
gains in private activities and is thus self-sustaining and transformative (politically as well 
as economically, as the more powerful middle demands government policies conducive to 
wealth creation), as opposed to being driven largely by exploitation of natural resources, by 
remittances, or by infusions of external aid. 
 
Figure 1 (see Appendix table for more detail) shows the economic command of the middle 
class so defined for selected countries, and the change in that indicator between 1990 and 
2004. (There is no obvious association between the change in the size of the middle class 
and change in the Gini over that period.  For China middle class growth is associated with a 
rising Gini while for India and Brazil it is associated with a declining Gini.  The same is 
true for other measures of inequality (not shown).  
                                                 
3 These implications depend in part on the relative gains or declines in income and share of the initially rich; 
the statements assume that the rich are not losing in absolute terms.  
4 For other recent definitions, see World Bank, 2007; Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato, 2000; and Bhalla, 
forthcoming. Defining the top 10 percent of people in every country as “rich” implies that of the 
approximate 30 million people in the U.S with 2004 monthly income at or above $6,059 are “rich”, while the 
approximate 264 million in China with 2004 monthly income of just $406.70 are rich.      
  3 
Latin America has for decades been the region with the highest inequality in the world. But 
in the last few years in Mexico and Brazil there have been substantial declines in poverty 
(using the $2 a day poverty line), notable declines in income inequality (measured by the 
Gini coefficient) – and in both countries a doubling of the proportion of people and of 
income in the middle class (Figure 1).
 5  These signs of success in poverty reduction and 
middle class growth contrast sharply with reversals in Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela, 
shown for the case of middle class growth in the figure. One reason may be that the latter 
countries have hewed less closely than Brazil and Mexico to standard IMF/World Bank 
macroeconomic policies, and in the case of Venezuela and Ecuador with their dependence 
on oil exports have been more vulnerable to currency appreciation which tends to be 
unfriendly to increasing employment and small business development. 
  
Latin America also has a history  – until about 1990 in most countries – of high inflation, 
high public debt, volatile monetary policy, and in part because of inflation, overvalued 
exchange rates. Its experience provides a useful starting point for reviewing the likely 
effects of poor macroeconomic policies on the inclusiveness of growth.  At the same time, 
the recent increases in the size and economic command of the middle class in Mexico and 
Brazil, where macro policies have markedly improved in the last decade, suggests that 
eventually – with a long lag – better macro policy (combined with a benign external 
environment and a commodity boom) can contribute to inclusive growth both by reducing 




“Where, Why and When Inequality Matters for Growth… 
 
 If a country (India for example, or China) has lower inequality today than Latin America 
has had historically, is the latter’s experience relevant?  I think so, for two reasons.  First, 
there are lessons to be extracted from the worst case and from any hint of recent progress; 
and second, many countries, including India and China, are currently experiencing 
increases in income inequality – in the case of China from a Gini of 0.29 in 1990 to .44 in 
2003.
6   In China the rising Gini appears to reflect the Kuznetzian story of initial increases 
because people are moving from low-productivity sectors (e.g. subsistence agriculture) to 
higher productivity (e.g. urban manufacturing) activities.  On the other hand, it could 
reflect structural factors which could eventually affect the sustainability of growth itself – 
politically if not economically. Birdsall (2007) refers to two empirical regularities: 
countries with per capita income below about $3000 per capita (in purchasing power parity 
terms) that have Gini coefficients above .45, are those where inequality stalls growth.
7  In 
                                                 
5 The declines in $2 a day poverty are often associated with two large government-run programs of 
conditional cash transfers: in Mexico Progresa (now called Oportunidades) and in Brazil Bolsa Familia.   
6 Reported Gini coefficients are from the WIDER (WIID2b) database; see 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm.  
7 Barro (2000) in cross-country regression analysis of the determinants of growth finds that the effect of 
inequality is negative at incomes at or below about $3000 per capita, and positive above that level.  Cornia et. 
al. (2004) conclude in their study of growth determinants that the negative effect of inequality kicks in only at 
high levels – at or above .45 Gini.   
  4the poorest countries, capital and information markets work less well, and the poor and 
middle strata, with limited collateral, are likely to have limited access to borrowing, 
reducing a country’s growth. Limited access to the capital market is probably the case for 
the rural poor and even urban middle-income groups in China. (Note that in China 
inequality has risen within rural as well as urban areas; see Table 1.) And countries with 
high income inequality are likely to have and reproduce two other kinds of inequality: 
inequality in the distribution of the underlying assets that generate income (land, education, 
financial wealth), and sufficient inequality in the distribution of political power that 
education, credit and other public programs fail to compensate for their unequal asset 
distribution. Again China may be an example.  The asset and political inequality usually 
mean that a large majority of the population cannot exploit the benefits of deeper markets, 
since they cannot easily acquire education or borrow to invest in wealth-creating 
businesses. The risk is that China and other countries where inequality is growing could 
enter the resulting inequality trap in which Latin America has been for many decades, in 
which not only has growth been non-inclusive; it has been lower than it might have been 
because only a minority of people were participating in the productivity increases that 
fundamentally drive growth.
8   
 
In the background: open economies and volatile global markets. 
 
I discuss macro policies below under the assumption that developing countries will 
continue the trend of the last two decades of maintaining or increasing their openness 
(including though with more caution with respect to capital) in an effort to fully exploit the 
potential benefits of integration into the global economy.  But because more open 
economies are more vulnerable to global financial and other shocks, and because the 
integration process produces losers (at least in the short run) as well as winners, 
maintaining good macro policy in an open economy can be politically difficult.  The 
challenge is all the more complicated where the size and command over income of the 
middle class is relatively small (and still heavily made up of households dependent on state 
and state-protected sectors).  It is, for example, the secure middle class in mature market 
economies that is most likely to support policies that favor openness, maintain price 
stability and help ensure a competitive exchange rate. In contrast, the poor and near-poor 
(below $10 a day in daily income) are more at risk of losing out with integration (generally 
lacking sufficient education or financial assets to exploit global good times and being 
vulnerable in global bad times),while having sufficient political voice to generate self-
defeating populist pressures or in immature democracies have their long-term economic 
interests betrayed by short-term patronage arrangements. 
 
The missing middle class in low-income countries. 
 
Countries with PPP per capita income below $1500 or so have virtually no middle class by 
my definition, because daily income per capita at the 90
th percentile is below $10. That is 
the case for India (shown in the figure) and most countries of sub-Saharan Africa.  Many 
such countries are highly dependent on aid, with aid financing as much as 40 percent of all 
                                                 
8 Birdsall (2007), discusses the evidence that high-enough inequality in poor-enough countries inhibits 
growth.  
  5government spending. The discussion of macro policies below does apply to them.  The 
tradeoffs, however, may be in some cases more difficult.  Heavy aid inflows can for 
example complicate exchange rate management to limit real appreciation that could 
undermine expansion of small business.  The key lesson may be for donors as much as 
country policymakers, to help ensure that aid flows include adequate support for key 
investments in power, ports, roads and other infrastructure that by reducing costs can help 
avoid pressure on the exchange rate, allowing for expansion of small business and 
increasing competitiveness in manufacturing, agro-industry and services for export.
9    
 
Three macroeconomic policies that matter for inclusive growth  
 
This brings us to the discussion of macro policies that are conducive to inclusive growth.  
 
1. Fiscal discipline, the more rule-based the better 
 
Developing countries, especially those with a bad history of inflation and poor debt 
management, cannot afford to run U.S., Japanese or European style deficits.  They need to 
accumulate a credible record of good fiscal management if they are to ensure growth that is 
inclusive – including reduced public borrowing to allow for lower interest rates, and a 
record of public savings during periods of growth to allow for temporary countercyclical 
deficit spending to protect poor and middle-income people during downturns.  
 
Most emerging markets and low-income countries have dramatically improved 
macroeconomic management since the early 1990s.   They are accumulating “good” 
history.  To lock in good history now requires institutionalizing a budget process that is 
transparent and rule-based, ensuring that habits and citizens’ expectations as well as 
legislation and regulatory systems support fiscal policy conducive to inclusive growth.   
Examples of good rules are: legal ceilings on indebtedness relative to GDP; a truly 
independent source of published estimates of actual and projected revenue and expenditure; 
rules to lock in additional fiscal effort during booms; and for natural resource rich 
countries, fiscal contingency funds that set aside unexpected revenue.  Countries where the 
middle class is large and growing are more likely to have the political support for 
adherence to such rules, in what could be a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth and good 
rule-based fiscal policy.  
 
The long arm of past fiscal indiscipline   
 
With the exception of Chile, most countries in Latin America have for years run fiscal 
deficits and still do (see Table 2). Past fiscal laxity meant governments either printed 
money, fueling inflation, or issued large amounts of debt, driving interest rates to onerous 
levels. The resulting inflation hurt the poor, since the poor’s capacity to protect their 
earnings – through indexed savings for example – is limited. High interest rates also 
undermined growth of a middle class by limiting the expansion of creditworthy small firms 
(which generally have no alternative to the local market for their financing needs) and thus 
of private investment and of jobs for the unskilled and semi-skilled. While the direct causal 
                                                 
9 This and related issues regarding aid in aid-dependent countries are explored in Birdsall (2007).   
  6link is not clear, high interest rates in Latin America since mid-1990 are probably 
associated with jobless growth. Despite an annual average growth rate since 1995 of 2.5 
percent in the region, measured unemployment rates have risen from 6 percent in 1003 to 8 
percent in 2006 (with it reaching 11 percent in 2003). 
 
Fiscal indiscipline is no longer the rule in Latin America (average inflation fell from close 
to 600 percent in 1990 to just over 7 percent between 2000-2006).  But past high borrowing 
means that debt service is still high (even taking into account reductions in the debt stock in 
the last few years) and has to be financed, reducing the scope for new public expenditures 
(Table 3).  In 2003 Brazil was spending 10 percent of its GDP on interest on its public 
debt.
10 To the extent the debt stock has to be rolled over (which depends on the extent to 
which overall spending can be reduced to pay off debt ) public borrowing will keep interest 
rates higher than otherwise, crowding out private investment and job creation.
11  Real 
interest rates were very high in Latin America in the 1990s, reaching more than 10 percent 
on average for the majority of countries, compared with 6 percent on average in Southeast 
Asia and about 5.6 percent in the United States 1990-2000.
12 Since 2001, interest rates 
have fallen against a backdrop of fairly low inflation in most Latin American countries, but 
they remain well above those in other regions.
13 Of course some public debt (to finance 
small deficits) is reasonable, especially when economic growth ensures that the ratio of 
debt to GDP is not continuously rising above a safe range.  But emerging market 
economies with a history of inflation and volatility (including some such as Turkey, 
Thailand and the Philippines outside of Latin America) should probably meet a tougher 
standard of net public debt to GDP than the standard for developed countries – the IMF 
suggests no more than 30 percent for emerging markets.   
   
 
History hurts in another way. Given high existing debt, Latin and other developing country 
governments determined to avoid new bouts of inflation have had to maintain tight fiscal 
policies in the last decade – in several cases including primary surpluses (i.e. fiscal 
surpluses net of interest payments) – as high as 4 and 5 percent of GDP (Table 4). That has 
reduced the fiscal space for public investment in roads, schools, health care, police training 
and so on -- services on which the poor rely heavily. In an unhappy combination, past high 
public borrowing in Latin America may be contributing to the crowding out of private 
investment, and high primary surpluses to finance debt service on current and past 
borrowing may be reducing public investment compared to countries in East Asia (Table 
5).    
 
                                                 
10 Derviş & Birdsall, 2006. 
11 In the OECD high real interest rates are associated with higher unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 
1999). The evidence linking high interest rates to unemployment is less clear for Latin America. The data are 
however, much “noisier” on real interest rates (due to noncaptured inflation volatility itself), the credit 
markets are much more segmented, and employment and unemployment data are less reliable. Still it is 
noteworthy unemployment and underemployment limit the ability of the poor and the near-poor to exploit 
their key asset, their own labor. 
12 World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2007. 
13 ECLAC, 2006. 
  7One other cost of past fiscal indiscipline that is particularly destructive of inclusive growth 
is the inability to implement countercyclical fiscal spending during economic downturns. 
During recessions in developed countries, governments increase spending on 
unemployment, food stamps and other safety net program payments. The resulting 
increases in public spending protect the poor and help insulate the middle class while 
helping to stimulate a sluggish economy. Such countercyclical measures, however, rely on 
confidence of market creditors (domestic and external) in the government’s willingness and 
ability to honor the new debt, and on local financial sectors able to absorb new debt.   
Except for Chile, other countries in Latin America have not been tested on this score since 
the 2001 debt crisis in Argentina.  Brazil, Mexico and others have implemented impressive 
programs of conditional cash transfers to poor households (conditional, for example, on 
keeping their children in school), which could be expanded in the event of a recession as 
long as the markets are sufficiently confident to finance larger deficits without interest rate 
increases that would offset the growth and inclusion benefits of the safety net programs.
14     
 
In short, Latin American countries are still paying for fiscal indiscipline that mostly ended 
more than a decade ago.  With the recent global economic boom, most have grown fast 
enough and kept overall fiscal deficits low enough to get ahead of the destructive debt 
dynamic in which the burden of past debt undermines aggregate growth. But a continuation 
of this progress relies heavily on more years of very tight fiscal policy (unless growth rates 
jump to Asian rates) and perhaps too heavily on a continuation of an unusually benign 
external environment, particularly for commodity producers.  Fortunately the increases in 
the size of the middle class (using my definition) in Mexico and Brazil suggest that the 
growth the region is now enjoying may be more inclusive than growth has been since the 
1970s.  Fifteen years of responsible fiscal policy have almost surely helped. 
 
 
Fiscal probity helps limit the volatility that hurts the poor and productive middle class. 
 
 Volatility is the outcome of many factors, including commodity price fluctuations and 
sudden reversals of foreign capital inflows over which governments in developing 
countries have limited control.  Latin America’s past patterns of stop-go spending (driven 
sometimes by periods of populist governments) have been a factor too, however, and have 
often been the cause of monetary policy that by accommodating fiscal indiscipline, further 
undermined investor confidence, raising interest rates and limiting job creation.  The 
region’s stronger fiscal position today, along with more flexible exchange rates and 
improved financial regulation and supervision, bode well – but recent calm may also rely 
mostly on ample global liquidity (itself at risk as I write this in August, 2007) and buoyant 
export markets.  
 
Volatility is not only bad for growth; it is particularly bad for inclusive growth. The poor 
and middle class gain less during booms (when those who already have real and financial 
assets gain most) and are the first to lose jobs during busts. The frequency of such crises in 
Latin America has resulted both in sharp increases of poverty in the short-term and hurt 
longer term growth because of the impact of crises and austerity programs on human 
                                                 
14 Lustig, 2000. 
  8capital. The downturn hurts more in developing countries because still underdeveloped 
credit markets mean that small firms are more likely to cut investments and poor and near-
poor households to take children out of school.  In the form of financial crisis, volatility 
moreover involves inequitable wealth transfers that create enduring adverse distributional 
effects. Evidence from the financial crises of the late 1990s in Asia and Latin America 
indicates that many poor and middle-income households did not recover assets they 
liquidated during severe downturns (in the case of Mexico, including middle-class owned 
homes)
15, and that many children in Mexico that left secondary school did not return when 
the economy recovered.     
 
What about monetary policy?   
 
As noted above, inflation hurts the poor. It is also the case that without credible monetary 
policy that preserves the role of the local currency as a store of value, it may be difficult to 
lower interest rates countercyclically because capital will flee (whereas in Latin America, 
capital markets are open); and it will be difficult to manage depreciations of the exchange 
rate without adverse effects on balance sheets.  In the past two decades, monetary policy in 
almost all parts of the developing world has become more responsible and credible, and 
better insulated from short-term political pressures.  In Latin America, poor monetary 
policy in the past started with and accompanied overspending and overborrowing by the 
government, implying that sound fiscal policy is necessary for sound monetary policy.  
 
What about the exchange rate?   
 
It is difficult to keep the exchange rate competitive (avoiding a real appreciation) if fiscal 
deficits or public borrowing is high. Yet a competitive exchange rate is critical to 
development and expansion of labor-intensive manufacturing and service exports.  See 
below. 
 
2. A “fair” tax and redistribution system
16
 
The tax side. 
 
Inclusive growth requires not only keeping aggregate spending in line with aggregate 
revenues.  It generally requires that tax systems and expenditures be progressive. 
 
The experience in Latin America is discouraging.  Reliance on the value-added tax, which 
is generally regressive, is much greater than in Europe
17 (60 vs. 30 percent of total 
revenue); higher overall and more progressive taxation in Europe reduce income inequality 
(and probably the burden on the middle class much more than in Latin America).
18 Along 
                                                 
15 Lustig (editor), 1995. 
16 This section is based on Birdsall, de la Torre and Menezes (2007, forthcoming), Chapter 4, which includes 
citations to the relevant facts and analyses. 
17 Tanzi and Zee (2000). Martner and Aldunate (2006) estimate that indirect taxes accounted for about 56 
percent of total tax revenues in Latin America and 31 percent of tax revenues in Europe in 2003-04. (Taken 
from Fair Growth). 
18 Lopez  & Perry, 2007. 
  9with loopholes and exemptions that tend to reduce the tax burden on the rich, tax evasion is 
rampant. Finally, high payroll taxes discourage job creation, hurting the poor and middle-
income groups more than the rich, whose income comes relatively more from capital. The 
overall result is revenue generation of on average 18 percent, well below what might be 
expected given average per capita income. Low revenue generation combined with 
admirable fiscal discipline obviously constrains public investment and expenditures that 
could otherwise be deployed to reduce inequality and induce more inclusive growth.
19  
Equally to the point, more visibly fair tax systems would not only encourage inclusive 
growth; they would make higher ratios of taxes to GDP more politically acceptable, 
including to the rich who easily now justify evasion (as would, of course, more efficient 
public spending and less corruption.)  In Argentina, the top 10 percent of households’ 
effective average tax rate was an estimated 8 percent in the late 1990s.  (In Africa the 
problem is heavy reliance on trade and other indirect taxes; relatively high taxes on imports 
raise input costs for businesses and keep consumer prices higher than otherwise.)  
 
The expenditure side.   
 
Greater spending – on health, education, and public infrastructure -- as long as it is 
minimally efficient, is one key to more inclusive growth.  Experience in Latin America also 
shows that the greatest hemorrhage in terms of inefficient, non-inclusive spending comes 
with poorly designed and politically driven pension programs.  In Latin America, the 
richest quintile of the population receives on average about 60 percent of net pension 
benefits (full benefit amount received minus total contributions), while the poorest quintile 
only receives 3 percent.
20 Appropriate design of pension systems is not a macroeconomic 
issue – except to the extent pension systems can end up taking so much fiscal space, 
without benefiting the bottom 80 percent of households, that they undermine fiscal 
discipline itself.  In the case of Brazil, a severely non-inclusive pension system was still 
costing as much as 3.5 percent of GDP a few years ago
21 – equivalent to the lost fiscal 
space associated with net primary surpluses – and it has been politically impossible to 
make anything but marginal changes to the system.  
 
3. A business-friendly exchange rate 
 
It is almost a cliché that a competitive exchange rate is the key to growth.  It is surely 
helpful to inclusive growth insofar as success in manufactured exports is almost always 
associated with investment in new enterprises and creation of jobs for the semi-skilled – in 
Japan and then Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s, and more recently in Mauritius, 
Vietnam and of course China.
22   The inflation that resulted in Latin America from 
monetizing a high fiscal deficit also brought persistently overvalued exchange rates 
                                                 
19 Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no evidence that greater public spending on redistribution 
(measured in terms of marginal and average tax rates and different types of social spending) is associated 
with lower aggregate growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Moreover, even where public expenditure is not 
progressive overall, it is likely to be more progressive than the distribution of market income.    
20 Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro, 2006. 
21 Krueger (no date). 
22 The distinction between a competitive and an undervalued exchange rate may also matter; there is 
considerable controversy over whether it is primarily the latter that “buys” export success.  
  10throughout the 1970s and even in the 1980s.  Excessive borrowing added to the temptations 
of inflation as a means to reduce otherwise ballooning public debt.  Protection of local 
industries then followed via tariffs and other barriers – reducing competitiveness.  Over the 
last two decades, Chile, the one country in Latin America with a longer history of fiscal 
rectitude, has been the one best able to manage its exchange rate to limit its appreciation.   
 
Fiscal discipline does not guarantee a competitive exchange rate, and government can get 
away with high deficits while avoiding currency appreciation – if as in India until recently, 
capital markets are closed and private savings to finance public debt can be captured, if 
growth prospects are especially good, and if absent any history of inflation people have 
confidence in the currency. But in most circumstances of most developing countries, 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate is likely not only to help growth, but help ensure 
growth is inclusive. The increase in the size of the middle class as I have defined it in urban 
China (Figure 1) is the outcome of multiple factors.  The exchange rate (which is arguably 
now more undervalued than “competitive” requires) is one of those.
23 In the case of Brazil 
and Mexico, the slaying of inflation in the early 1990s has made it easier to avoid the 
overvaluation which for two prior decades hurt exports.   
 
 
Conclusion: From pro-poor to inclusive, middle class growth  
 
That inflation hurts the poor is now widely acknowledged.
24  A similar acknowledgement 
is needed regarding the dependence of the middle class in all economies on other 
ingredients of a stable macroeconomic environment. Economic volatility due to high fiscal 
deficits, poor monetary policy, unsustainable public borrowing, undervalued exchange 
rates that temporarily make imports cheap - all these along with inflation are also bad for 
the incipient middle class. The experience of the mature Western economies suggests that 
the poor benefit when an economically strong middle class insists on accountable 
government and supports, through their willingness to pay taxes, universal and adequate 
public services.  That experience suggests that inclusive growth as I have defined it will 
benefit poor people indirectly as well as directly, by helping them escape their poverty.  
Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the two countries in Latin America that have sustained 
cash transfer programs for the very poor are two where there has been a doubling in the 
ranks and economic weight of the middle class. It is hard to imagine that would have been 
possible without more than a decade in which those countries stayed the course on tough 








                                                 
23 Some currency appreciation in China and complementary macroeconomic policies to stimulate more 
domestic demand driven growth are inevitable if long-run and inclusive growth is to be sustained. 
24 Easterly and Fischer (2001). 
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Figure 1: Proportion of income held by middle class: 
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* Or most recent available year.  
The middle class is defined as individuals with at least $10 in each year ($7.20 in 1993 PPP terms), who are 
at or below the 90
th decile of the income distribution in their own country. 
Figures in parentheses below countries indicate 2004 daily per capita income at the 90
th decile of the income 
distribution. 
 Source: Author’s calculations using the World Bank’s PovCal data. 
  13Table 1: Income per capita, Gini coefficients, Income level decile ratios and Share of 
income of the middle strata 
Selected Countries, 2004 
 








10th and 9th 
decile 
(2004) 
 Income level 






   Share of Income 
of Middle Strata 
(2004) 
Brazil $3,470  57.0  2.78  1.51  36.01 
Chile* $3,571  54.8  3.00  1.48  36.23 
Ecuador** $1,811  53.4  2.90  1.46  36.62 
Argentina $3,470  51.3  2.30  1.41  41.14 
Zambia $492  50.7  4.14  1.54  28.18 
Venezuela $1,401  48.2  2.04  1.37  45.11 
Nepal $969  47.3  2.68 1.37  40.96 
China*** $1,730  46.6  1.78  1.35  45.51 
Mexico $3,044  46.1  2.48  1.41  41.08 
Kenya $1,206  42.5  2.60  1.42  38.31 
Ghana**** $689 40.7  2.20  1.37  42.97 
United States  $29,723  39.4  1.87  1.30  48.77 
India $632  34.6  2.20 1.38 48.07 
Egypt $1,096  34.4  3.07  1.45  36.93 
Sweden***** $21,009  25.7  1.59  1.16  54.40 
* Data available for 2003 
     ** Data available for 2002 
   *** Data available for 2002 
**** Data available for 2000 
***** Data available for 2003 
Source: Author’s calculation using PovCal & WIDER (WIID2b). 
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Table 2: Fiscal Deficits of Selected Countries, 1995, 2000, 2003 
 
Country  1995 2000 2003 
Argentina 1.15 2.28 0.13 
Bolivia 2.32 3.33 7.4 
Brazil 6.09* NA NA 
Chile** -2.58 -0.14 NA 
Colombia 2.3 6.72 4.91 
Ecuador** 1.01 -0.3 1.36 
Guatemala 0.48 1.96 1.95 
Mexico 0.53 1.25 1.3 
Nicaragua 0.31 3.85 2.92 
Peru 1.11 1.84 1.91 
Venezuela 3.61 1.65 NA 
Source: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics CD-Rom (2007) 
*This value is for 1994 since 1995 data for Brazil were unavailable 
**Minus indicates budget surpluses
  15Table 3: Total Debt Service & Total Debt Stock, Selected Countries, 1990 and 2005 
 
Total Debt Service (% of exports* 
of goods, services and income) 
Total Debt Service (% of 
revenue, excluding grants) 
Total Debt Stock** 
(%GDP)  
Countries  1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005 
Argentina  37  21  64 46  44 62 
Brazil 22  45  8  27  26  23 
Mexico  21  17  28 68  40 21 
Peru  11  26  14 40  76 36 
Malaysia  13  6  37 39  35 39 
Indonesia  33  25  46 43  61 48 
Thailand  17  15  54 53  33 29 
*Exports refer to exports of goods, services, income and workers’ remittances 
**Total debt stock refers to external plus domestic debt 
a. For Argentina, 2003 and 2004 data respectively 
b. For Brazil, 1998 data 
c. Mexico, 2002 data 
d. Malaysia, 2003 data  
e. Indonesia, 2002  and 2004data respectively 
f. Thailand, 2003 and 2005 data respectively 
Source: 2007, World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, World Bank        
 
  16Table 4: Primary Surpluses in Selected High-Debt Emerging Market Countries 
 
  
Year with highest primary surplus since 
1990 
(% of GDP) 
Primary surplus 
 
(% of GDP) 
      2002 
Argentina  1.5 (1993)  0.9 
Brazil 3.9  (2002)  3.9 
Bulgaria  9.2 (1996)  1.5 
Costa Rica  2.9 (1993)  -0.3 
Ecuador  7.1 (1990)  4.5 
Egypt
b -  2.6 
India  -1.2 (1997)  -3.7 
Indonesia  3.8 (1990, 2002)  3.8 
Jordan  -  -1.2 
Lebanon  3.0 (2002)  3.0 
Malaysia  10.2 (1997)  3.1 
Morocco  3.4 (1992)  -0.2 
Nigeria  10.5 (1990)  1.6 
Pakistan  2.8 (2001)  2.4 
Panama  7.2 (1992)  2.0 
Philippines  5.9 (1994, 1996)  -0.6 
Turkey  5.5 (2001)  4.1 
Uruguay  2.9 (1992)  0.3 
Source: Derviş & Birdsall, 2006. 
Notes:       
b. 1999 data.       
  
 


















    
Brazil 4.53  15.77 20.29 
Mexico 3.58  17.69  21.28 
Argentina 1.98  15.70  17.68 
Venezuela 9.93  7.10  17.03 
Peru 3.47  17.74  21.22 
South Korea  7.82  27.95  35.77 
Malaysia 12.33  25.79  38.12 
Indonesia 7.92  20.96  28.89 
Source: World Bank Global Development Network Growth Database (2001). 
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Appendix: Income per capita, Gini coefficients and measures of Middle Class: 

























































Argentina (urban)*  $4233 $3470 45.4 51.3 46.0% 34.0% 50.2% 41.7% 
Brazil   $2793 $3571 60.7 57.0 18.0% 29.5% 25.2% 34.8% 
Chile **  $3801 $5228 55.4 54.8 31.2% 45.4% 34.4% 42.2% 





China (urban)  $1,194 $2,856 24.8 34  0.0%
 b 31.50% 0.0%
 b 38.5% 
China (combined: 
urban & rural)  $695  $1730 36.0 46.6 0.0%
 b 8.1% 0.0%
 b 14.6%
b
Ecuador***  $1894 $1811 50.5 53.4 8.7% 6.8% 14.2%  11.4% 
















Mexico*****  $2,628 $3,044  55.1 46.1 17.4% 29.0% 23.4% 35.7% 
Sweden******  $20,086  $21,009  24.0 25.7 90.0% 90.0% 81.0% 77.8% 
United 
States*******  $23,868  $29,723  37.2 39.4 88.9% 90.0% 73.7% 70.9% 
Venezuela  $2634 $1401 44.2 48.2 23.9%  1.6%
 b 32.2% 3.1%
 b
*Data from 1992 and 2003  
**Data from 1990 and 2003 
***Data from 1987 and 1998 
****Data from 1988 and 2004 
***** Data from 1989 and 2004 
******Data from 1987 and 2002 
*******Data from 1986 and 2000 
a Lower absolute bound: $7.20 (1993 PPP$ per capita per day). This represents $10.00 (2005 PPP$ per capita per day).  
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